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CASENOTE
LABOR LAW-REMOVAL OF ACTION BROUGHT FOR BREACH OF No-
STRIKE CLAUSE IN COLLECTIvE BARGANING CONTRACT-AVCO Corp v.
Aero Lodge 735, Intl Ass'n of Machinist, 376 F.2 337 (6th Cir. 1967),
cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 103 (1967).
A series of work stoppages by members of the defendant union
resulted in a plantwide strike on plaintiff's plant in Nashville,
Tennessee on October 15, 1965. Avco, alleging a violation of the
existing collective bargaining agreement, brought an action in a
Tennessee state court seeking to enjoin the strike, and asking for
general relief. A temporary injunction was granted and the union
filed a petition for removal of the action to United States district
court.1 Upon removal, the union moved for dissolution of the
temporary restraining order and dismissal of the action on the
basis that the district court had no power to issue or maintain the
injunction due to the restrictions of the Norris-La Guardia Act;2
and Avco moved to remand to the state court on the grounds that
the complaint was founded on a breach of contract arising under
state law and not on a "claim or right arising under the Constitu-
1 The petition for removal in these cases is made pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441 (1948). § 1441 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such action
is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdic-
tion founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the
citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be
removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action
is brought.
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action,
which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or
more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire
case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues
therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise
within its original jurisdiction.
2 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1932):
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person
or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms
are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of
the following acts:
(a) ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment ....
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tion, Treaties or laws of the United States."3 Avco also contended
that the district court did not have jurisdiction of the action by
virtue of the anti-injunction provisions of the Nortis-La Guardia
Act.4 The district court denied Avco's motion to remand to the
state court and Avco appealed. Held, affirmed. The district court
does have original jurisdiction of the action under the provisions
of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.5
This holding of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is in
direct conflict with the holding of the third circuit in American
Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Marine Division Union of Operating Engi-
neers, AFL-CIO,6 which is expressly repudiated by the court in
Avco. The court in American Dredging held that the cause of action
brought in a state court was based solely on a state created right,
and thus it is not removable when the complaint does not disclose
within its four corners that the action is based upon federal law.7
The holding of American Dredging is based on the propositions that
3 The employer's allegation was that the action was not based on fed-
eral law as is required by the Removal Statute. See n. 1 supra.
4 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1932). The employer argued that this section is a
limitation on the subject matter jurisidiction of the court rather than
on the equity jurisdiction of the court. If the section is a limitation
on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts then the removal is
not allowed because the federal court does not have the originaljurisdiction required by the Removal Statute. However, if the statute
is a limitation merely on the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts,
the action is removable and the federal court has jurisdiction of the
suit but has no power to issue an injunction. The federal district
courts are split on the isue. For cases in which remand was granted
see California Packing Corp. v. Local 142, ILWU, 253 F. Supp. 597
(D. Hawaii 1966); Merchants Refrigerating Co. v. Local 6, ILWU,
213 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Calif. 1963); Lock Joint Pipe Co. v. Anderson,
127 F. Supp. 692 (W.D. Mo. 1955); Castle & Cooke Terminals v. Local
137, ILWU, 110 F. Supp. 247 (D. Hawaii 1953); Home Building Corp.
v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 53 F. Supp. 804 (W.D. Mo. 1943). For
cases in which remand was denied see Oman Constr. Co. v. Local 327,
Int'l. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 263 F. Supp. 181 (M.D. Tenn. 1966);
Food Fair Stores v. Retail Clerks District Council 11, 229 F. Supp. 123
(E.D. Pa. 1964); Tri-Boro Bagle Co. v. Bakery Drivers Local 802,
228 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. N.Y. 1963); Crestwood Dairy v. Kelley, 222 F.
Supp. 614 (E.D. N.Y. 1963); Pocahontas Terminal Corp. v. Portland
Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council, 93 F. Supp. 217 (D. Maine 1950).
5 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947):
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organiza-
tions, may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in contro-
versy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
6 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
7 Id. at 850.
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a labor dispute can give rise to a state cause of action as well as a
federal cause of action and the plaintiff is free to pursue whichever
he chooses; section 3018 did not pre-empt the area of labor rela-
tions; and in order for a case to be removable, under the doctrine of
Gulley v. First National Bank,9 the federal jurisdiction must be
found within the four corners of the complaint. The court also used
the theory that the provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act denying
the district courts jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor dis-
putes,10 denied them jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The court
refused to "give sanction to an exercise in futility" by saying that
a district court "has subject matter jurisdiction of a cause of action
... when it does not in the first place have jurisdiction to entertain
and decide it upon its merits .... ""
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act gives the federal courts
jurisdiction in suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce.12 In the now famous case of Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills"3 the Supreme Court held that section 301 was more
than a procedural statute; it also creates substantive law so that the
federal courts have the power to grant relief in actions brought
under section 301. The courts were left to develop a body of federal
labor law to be applied to cases brought under section 301. While
section 301 did not pre-empt the area to the extent of divesting
state courts of jurisdiction over such actions,'4 the state courts are
compelled to apply the federal labor law.'5 In this process of devel-
oping a new body of federal labor law however, the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act stand intact. The Supreme
Court held in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson8 that section 301
does not impliedly repeal the Norris-La Guardia Act and the two
must stand together. The dominant theme of this whole line of
cases is the desire to create a substantive labor law to be applied
in all cases and provide a consistency that is not otherwise available.
From this background arises the issue involved in Avco and
American Dredging, i.e., whether an action for breach of a no-strike
clause in a collective bargaining agreement is removable from state
to federal court. Under the Removal Statute, "any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
8 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) [hereinafter referred to as § 301].
9 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
10 See note 4 supra.
11 338 F.2d 837, 842 (1964).
12 See note 5 supra.
13 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
14 Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
15 Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
16 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
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States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant
or the defendants, to the district court of the United States .... 17
When an employer brings an action to enjoin a strike as being
in violation of a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the union is desirous of immediately removing the action to
federal court where there is no "jurisdiction" to issue an injunc-
tion against the strike due to the Norris-La Guardia Act.'8 The
union seeks to remove pursuant to the Removal Statute with
jurisdiction of the federal court based on section 301. The opposi-
tion to removal is that the action is based solely on a state-created
right and not upon section 301; and that the Norris La-Guardia Act
denies the federal courts the jurisdiction to entertain these suits.
In American Dredging both of these arguments were adopted; in
Avco they were rejected.
The argument is based on the Gulley doctrine that the nature of
the action (state or federal) must be determined from the four
corners of the complaint. Under this doctrine the "plaintiff is the
master of his own case" and is entitled to bring the cause of action
on the law he desires and in the forum he desires.19 On this point
Avco holds that a state created cause of action can no longer exist
as the area is pre-empted by section 301. The court in Avco said
that "all rights and claims arising from a collective bargaining
agreement in an industry affecting interstate commerce arise under
Federal law. State law does not exist as an independent source of
private rights to enforce collective bargaining contracts.... The
force of Federal preemption in this area cannot be avoided by failing
to mention Section 301 in the complaint. '20 Relying on Lincoln
Mills, Lucas Flour and Dowd Box, the court in Avco concludes that
although the state courts do have concurrent jurisdiction in section
301 cases they are bound to apply federal law;21 had the action
remained in state court federal law would be controlling; thus the
action is one arising under the laws of the United States. This is
in contrast to the American Dredging holding that the state cause
of action is an entity separate and distinct from an action under sec-
17 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1948).
Is Many states have "baby Norris-La Guardia Acts" which are patterned
after the federal statute. Few are copied exactly after the federal
statute with each state making its own adjustments. Also many states
have no provisions similar to the Norris-La Guardia Act. For a survey
of these state laws see Aaron, Labor Injunctions in The State Courts-
Part I: A Survey, 50 VA. L. REv. 951 (1964).
19 See The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).
20 Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Ass'n of Mach.
and Aerospace Workers, 376 F.2d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1967).
21 Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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tion 301. Under the American Dredging result a premium would be
placed on artfully drawn pleadings22 and the result of a particular
case would be highly dependent upon the situs of the activity.' Al-
lowing enforcement of a state cause of action by a state court,
decided on the basis of state law24 in this area is clearly repugnant
to the policy of establishing a single body of federal labor law
intended to insure consistent results in labor cases. The body of
law created under section 301 is clearly federal and the need for a
single body of federal law is compelling.25
The second step in the argument against removal is based on
a literal interpretation of the wording of the Norris-La Guardia
Act.26 The act provides that "[n] o court of the United States27 shall
have jurisdiction... [to restrain certain acts one of which is refusing
to perform any work.]" 28 The American Dredging decision is based
on the premise that the word "jurisdiction" is used exactly the same
in section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act as it is in section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act. Under this interpretation the district courts are
not only deprived of the power to issue an injunction, they do not
22 The commentators have argued that the outcome of a removal case
in these circumstances may to a large extent depend on the relief
prayed for in the petition. The argument runs that if injunctive relief
alone is asked for the federal court may not have jurisdiction due
to the Norris-La Guardia Act; but if only damages are asked for or
if the petition asks for damages and an injunction the case is more
likely removable due to the provisions of the Removal Statute that
if a separate claim which is removable is sued upon with a non-
removable claim, the district court may either hear the suit in its
entirety or remand it in its entirety. Professor Aaron concludes that
the suit should be removable in either situation but submits that the
federal courts are likely to deny removal if an injunction alone is
sought and if both an injunction and damages are sought the federal
court is likely to split the cause and remand the injunction prayer
and hear the damages claim. Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective
Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions, 63 CoLun. L. REV. 127
(1963). This extended discussion is a good example of the premium
placed on drafting of pleadings and the uncertainty which remains
regardless of how carefully the pleadings are drawn.
To circumvent this argument, in situations where the employer
has asked only for an injunction, several defendant unions have
attempted to invoke rule 54 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to assist removal. Rule 54 (c) provides that federal courts may
"grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled even if the party has not demanded such relief in his plead-
ings." This argument states that even if the plaintiff does not ask for
damages the federal courts have the power to award damages and
the petition asking for only an injunction should be treated the same
as one asking for damages also. For a discussion of this argument see
Comment, The Norris-LaGuardia Act and Section 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act-Problems of Jurisdiction and Removal in the Enforce-
ability of Collectively Bargained No-Strike Agreements, 60 Nw.
U. L. REv. 489, 506 (1965).
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have the power to entertain a suit asking for an injunction. Thus
since the district court does not have jurisdiction of the suit, so the
argument goes, removal is not possible.
The court in Avco holds that jurisdiction does not have the same
meaning in section 4 as it does in section 301.29 Under this holding
"[t]he Norris-La Guardia Act does not deny to Federal Courts juris-
diction over the parties or the subject matter. The Federal Courts
are denied the power to grant injunctive relief under the provision
of Section 4 of the Act, and permitted to grant injunctive relief
under the provision of Section 7 of the Act. The Norris-La Guardia
Act does not limit the power of the Court to entertain the suit.130
This theory adopts an argument by Professor Chaffee3 ' that the
Norris-La Guardia Act limits only the equity jurisdiction of the
Federal Court and is not a limitation on the power of the court.32
The question of removal, as Judge Hastie points out in his dis-
sent in American Dredging, is a technical question which must be
decided because a more vital question hasn't been answered. This
more vital question is whether the Norris-La Guardia anti-injunc-
tion provisions are applicable to the states.3 3 The Supreme Court
has (in the past) expressly avoided the question;34 Judge Hastie is
convinced that the provisions are applicable to the states;35 and a
23 See Comment, Substantive Law and the Labor Contract-Two Ne-
braska Puzzles, 43 NEB. L. REV. 560, 575 (1964).
24 "The question then is, what is the substantive law to be applied in
suits under § 301 (a)? We conclude that the substantive law to apply
in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion
from the policy of our national labor laws." Textile Workers Union
of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
25 See Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
America v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962).
20 See Note, 51 VA. L. REV. 973, 983 (1965).
27 The phrase "court of the United States" means solely courts created
by Congress under Article III of the Constitution and does not refer
to state or territorial courts. ILWU v. Wirtz, 170 F.2d 183 (9th Cir.
1948).
28 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1932) (emphasis added).
29 Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int. Ass'n of Mach. and Aerospace
Workers, 376 F.2d 337, 341 (6th Cir. 1967).
30 Id.
31 Z. Chaffee, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurTy 368 (1950).
32 Profesor Aaron agrees with this conclusion and himself concludes
that "removal of the case from state court should be allowed under
Section 1441 (a) of the Judicial Code." Aaron, Strikes in Breach of
Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 1027, 1046 (1963).
33 See Id.
34 Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 514 n.8 (1962).
35 American Dredging v. Local 25, Marine Division, International Union
of Operating Engineers, 338 F.2d 837, 858 (3rd Cir. 1964) (dissenting
opinion).
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leading California case30 has held that the provisions are not applic-
able to the states.
The Sinclair case held that section 4 is an integral part of the
federal labor policy, and section 301 must be used in conjunction
with section 4, not in place of section 4. To be consistent with the
policy of establishing a body of federal labor law as commanded by
the Supreme Court in Lincoln Mills, the Norris-La Guardia Act must
be applied to the states. 7 The role of the injunction in a labor dis-
pute cannot be over-emphasized 3 8 It is the most controversial and
the most lethal weapon in the arsenal of the employer and its proper
role has been extensively debated. But the question here is not
whether the injunction should be available or not.3 9 The point is
that it is not available in federal courts,40 while it is available in
state courts in various different forms and often with little or no
restrictions.41 As long as this situation exists42 it will be impossible
to develop a consistent labor law.
43
The holding of Avco is a step in the right direction toward
developing a uniform labor law. Avco will in effect apply the
Norris-La Guardia Act anti-injunction provisions to state courts
in the sixth circuit for the union will be free to remove an action
from any state court with the power to enjoin their strike. Thus
the employer will be deprived of a remedy available to him before
the enactment of section 301 and the "fears" of the dissent in Sinclair
will be realized.44 In order to insure a consistent body of federal
labor law this issue must be resolved and hopefully will be resolved
by the Supreme Court in its October 1967 term.
4 5
William E. Marsh, '68
36 McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters, 49
Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957).
37 See Independent Oil Workers v. Scony Mobil Oil Co., 85 N.J. Super.
453, 460, 205 A.2d 78 (1964); Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective
Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions, 63 CoLum. L. REV. 1027,
1052 (1963).
38 See generally F. FaRNKvRmm and N. GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
(1930).
39 For an opinion that the American Dredging decision is based on a basic
policy disagreement with Sinclair and a desire to make the injunc-
tion available to the employers see Note, 51 VA. L. REv. 973, 982 (1965).
40 Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 95 (1962).
41 See note 20, supra.
42 For a discussion on Congressional resolution of the issues presented
in this area see Wellington and Albert, Statutory Interpretation and
the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE
L. J. 1547 (1963).
43 See Grove, Removal of Civil Actions for Breach of Labor Contract-
Confusion Reigns, 18 LAB. L. J. 278 (1967).
44 See 370 U.S. 195, 227 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
45 Cert. has been granted in Avco. 88 S. Ct. 103 (1967).
